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UNCONSTITUTIONAL VAGUENESS AND
RESTRICTIVENESS IN THE CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS
OF THE OBSCENITY STANDARD: A CRITICAL
READING OF THE MILLER TEST GENEALOGY
Javier Romero
INTRODUCTION
My taste for women was awakened by the blows of a beautiful and
voluptuous creature in a fur jacket who looked like an angry queen.
From that day on my aunt became the most desirable woman on
God's earth.'
My omission of quotation marks uncomfortably decontextualizes
the words of Leopold von Sacher-Masoch, a German novelist whoseS 2
work and life inspired the term masochism. Moreover, the omission
threatens to color the perception of the subject at hand, which is not
physical abuse, incest, or masochism, but the role of contextual analy-
sis in relation to constitutional obscenity doctrine. In isolation, the
above quotation can be construed by many as offensive and possibly
even obscene, especially if perceived as the sexual musings of a child
or if previous lines had been included which describe how the young
narrator was tied and bound by the aunt and beaten bloody, all to his
delight.3 But, placed in the context of the novel or even of this Com-
ment, the offensiveness is mitigated.
J.D., 2005, University of Pennsylvania Law School; A.M., 1999, Dartmouth College; B.A.,
1996, Cornell University. I wish to thank Professors Edwin Baker and Seth Kreimer for their
guidance and the Board and staff of the Journal of Constitutional Law for their patience and assis-
tance with the revision of this Comment.
LEOPOLD VON SACHER-MASOCH, VENUS IN FURS (1870), reprinted in MASOCHISM 175 (Jean
McNeil trans., Zone Books 1991).
- Dr. Richard von Krafft-Ebing in Psychopathia Sexualis, a scientific study of sexuality, coined
the term masochism: "I feel justified in calling this sexual anomaly 'Masochism,' because the
author Sacher-Masoch frequently made this perversion, which up to his time was quite unknown
to the scientific world as such, the substratum of his writings." RICHARD VON KRAFFT-EBING,
PSYCHOPATHIA SEXUALIS 131-34 (F.J. Rebman trans., 1926) (1886).
3 Von Sacher-Masoch wrote:
Without asking any questions, they seized me and in spite of my resistance, bound me
hand and foot. Then with a wicked smile my aunt rolled up her sleeve and began to beat
me with a long switch. She laid about me so hard that she drew blood... She had me
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The relevance of context is integral to the current doctrine on ob-
scenity law, as the trier of fact is asked to make her assessment of the
material in question by considering it "as a whole." In his concur-
rence in Ashcroft v. ACLU, Justice William Kennedy raised the issue of
how to determine context for purposes of an obscenity analysis5 when
the material in question is located on the Internet.6  His concern
stems from the radical decontextualization of text and images con-
tained in this medium, as opposed to other media such as books and
film that have discernible origins and ends.7 The inherent lack of
context of the Internet threatens to render the Miller test overbroad.
Though particularly evident in the context of the Internet, the
problem of unconstitutional restrictiveness has characterized the ob-
scenity standard since it was first implemented and incorporated as
constitutional doctrine in 1957. 8 The Supreme Court recognized the
importance of looking at context when determining whether material
was obscene and required that triers of fact not consider isolated ex-
cerpts, but "the dominant theme as a whole" 9- one gesture among
many that was aimed to cure the defect of unconstitutional restric-
tiveness' ° in the existing obscenity standard."
In this Comment, I argue that the incorporation of "as a whole" to
the obscenity standard, while it was an improvement over the then-
existing test, introduced an additional component of vagueness to an
already unclear standard, and shifted the test's purpose from detect-
unbound but I then had to go down on my knees to her, thank her for the punishment
and kiss her hand. What a supersensual lunatic I was!
VON SACHER-MASOCH, supra note 1, at 174-75.
4 SeeMiller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) ("(a) [W]hether 'the average person, apply-
ing contemporary community standards' would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to
the prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way,
sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken
as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.") (citations omitted).
5 The current test for determining whether material is obscene and consequently unconsti-
tutionally unprotected speech, known as the Miller test, was articulated by the Supreme Court in
Miller v. California. See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 574 (2002) (citing the Miller test as the
test for obscene, unprotected speech).
6 Id. at 600-01 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("Likewise, it is essential to answer the vexing
question of what it means to evaluate Internet material 'as a whole.'").
7 See id. at 601 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("It is unclear, however, what constitutes the de-
nominator-that is, the material to be taken as a whole-in the context of the World Wide
Web.").
8 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957) (holding that obscenity is constitutionally
unprotected speech and articulating a defining standard to determine obscenity).
9 Id.
to Id. at 489 (rejecting an older standard "as unconstitutionally restrictive of the freedoms of
speech and press").
1 The then-existing standard was taken from Regina v. Hicklin, 3 L.R. 359 (Q.B. 1868), a
common law case, which required an analysis merely of isolated excerpts of the ostensibly ob-
scene material.
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ing protected sex speech, as Justice Brennan understood it, to detect-
ing appropriate fora or media for sex speech. The Court has manu-
factured a series of glosses that render the "as a whole" part of the ob-
scenity test a separate analysis, that by itself may be dispositive of the
question of whether sex speech is protected speech.
Part I looks at the 1957 Supreme Court decision in Roth, where
the current test was born, alongside an earlier Second Circuit opin-
ion penned by Judge Augustus N. Hand, which was the first federal
opinion to implement the contextual analysis later incorporated in
Roth. The comparison highlights Justice Brennan's construction of a
test that would effectively cure the restrictiveness problem while not
endangering the constitutional protection extended to sex speech.
Though both Brennan and Hand subscribed to a similar theory of
free speech doctrine, Hand's version of the analysis, which is in effect
today as the Miller test, represented a much more restrictive applica-
tion.
Part II traces the evolution of the contextual analysis, noting its
inevitable shift from Brennan's hoped-for tool for detecting pro-
tected sex speech to a regulatory device that dictated the manner and
form in which protected sex speech was to be communicated. This
Part discusses the contextual requirements imposed by different
glosses, and how they overlook the intrinsic nature of some media by
requiring that they conform to the standards imposed by the glosses.
In concluding, I iterate that the evolution of the "as a whole"
analysis reveals, as Brennan admits in his dissent in Paris Adult Theatre
I v. Slaton,2 that there is no practical way of defining obscenity that
does not create significant constitutional infirmities.
I. THE INHERENT LIMITATIONS OF CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS
IN DEFINING OBSCENITY
Though both Justice Brennan and Judge Augustus Hand ap-
proach the First Amendment question of whether obscenity is pro-
tected speech from the same perspective-that only speech contribut-
ing to the "marketplace of ideas" merits constitutional protection-
each presents competing views on the same contextual analysis.
A. Justice Brennan's Objective: To Preserve the Status of Protected Sex Speech
In 1957, the Supreme Court in Roth v. United States tackled the
question of "whether obscenity is utterance within the area of pro-
tected speech and press" 3 and unceremoniously held that it was not.
4
12 413 U.S. 49, 73, 79-80 (1973) (Brennan,J., dissenting).
13 Roth, 354 U.S. at 481.
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Considering the "tortured history"'5 this decision would spawn, the
opinion was remarkably concise-yet also revealing, because it relied
on two premises that no longer form part of contemporary obscenity
doctrine: obscenity is speech "utterly without redeeming social im-
portance,"' 6 and sex speech has significant value worth protecting.1
7
Brennan initially broached the matter by acknowledging that pro-
tection is iven to speech and press "to assure unfettered interchange
of ideas,"' and continued with heartening conviction: "All ideas hav-
ing even the slightest redeeming social importance-unorthodox
ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate
of opinion-have the full protection of the guaranties, unless exclud-
able because they encroach upon the limited area of more important
interests."' 9 This explanation is consistent with Brennan's adherence
to the "marketplace of ideas" theory first articulated by Justice
Holmes in 1919:
Brennan's framing of the issue gives the impression that obscenity
might rightly be within the scope of protected speech, as it is certainly
characterized by many as "unorthodox," "controversial," and "hate-
ful," and arguably does not encroach upon more important inter-
ests.2 ' But, the dies irae: "[I]mplicit in the history of the First
Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeem-
14 See id. at 485 (holding that "obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected
speech or press").
15 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 20 (1973) ("[I]t is useful for us to focus on two of the
landmark cases in the somewhat tortured history of the Court's obscenity decisions.").
16 Roth, 354 U.S. at 484. Today, obscenity doctrine requires that speech possess "serious"
value. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 24 (holding speech without "serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value" to be unprotected); Paris Adult Theatre I, 413 U.S. at 97 (Brennan,J., dissenting)
(objecting to the majority ignoring "the definition of 'obscenity' as expression utterly lacking in
social importance").
17 See Roth, 354 U.S. at 487-88 (highlighting the importance of the "portrayal of sex, e.g., in
art, literature and scientific works"); see also Geoffrey R. Stone, Justice Brennan and the Freedom of
Speech: A First Amendment Odyssey, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1333, 1336 (1991) (discussing Brennan's
treatment of the First Amendment issue in Roth as inconsistent with his later approaches to simi-
lar questions).
IS Roth, 354 U.S. at 484.
19 Id.
20 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("[T]he ulti-
mate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is the
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is
the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the the-
ory of our Constitution."); see C. EDWIN BAKER, HuMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 8-10
(1989) ("Justice Brennan denied obscenity constitutional protection precisely by identifying
obscenity as that material that does not contribute to the marketplace of ideas.").
21 Roth, 354 U.S. at 484; see Miller, 413 U.S. at 18-19 ("This Court has recognized that the
States have a legitimate interest in prohibiting dissemination or exhibition of obscene material
when the mode of dissemination carries with it a significant danger of offending the sensibilities
of unwilling recipients or of exposure to juveniles.").
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ing social importance. 2  And that is how Brennan closes the discus-
sion, only further substantiating the holding by adding, "This rejec-
tion ... is mirrored in the universal judgment that obscenity should
be restrained, reflected in the international agreement of over fifty
nations, in the obscenity laws of all of the forty-eight states, and in the
twenty obscenity laws enacted by the Congress from 1842 to 1956."
23
This anticlimactic analysis reflects significant discomfort on Bren-
nan's part with the issue at hand,24 as later evidenced by the Justice's
revocation of the holding in Roth in his dissenting opinion in Paris .25
Yet in Roth, his ability to articulate hastily the unworthiness of obscen-
ity seems likely tempered by his belief that obscenity was obviously
distinct from protected sex speech and that the two could be distin-
guished for constitutional purposes by a subjective standard. Signifi-
cantly, Justice Brennan expostulates on the importance of sex speech:
[S]ex and obscenity are not synonymous. Obscene material is material
which deals with sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest. The
portrayal of sex.., is not itself sufficient reason to deny material the con-
stitutional protection of freedom of speech and press. Sex, a great and
mysterious motive force in human life, has indisputably been a subject of
absorbing interest to mankind through the ages; it is one of the vital
problems of human interest and public concern.
As his interpolation on the value of sex speech and his dissent in Paris
I suggest, the constitutional concern is over defining obscenity, in
great part, to preserve protected sex speech. Brennan's understand-
ing of sex speech is nuanced. As Professors Frederick Schauer and
Edwin Baker have argued separately, what makes obscenity and not
other sex speech unworthy of constitutional protection is not solely
its appeal to prurient interest, but that beyond this "physical effect,"
it does nothing more.28 Protected speech, therefore, may have a
physical effect but, as Brennan suggested, that "is not itself sufficient
reason to deny material the constitutional protection of freedom of
speech and press. 2 9 Or, to put it differently, the speech in question
22 Roth, 354 U.S. at 484.
23 Id. at 484-85.
24 See Rodney A. Grunes, Justice Brennan and the Problem of Obscenity, 22 SETON HALL L. REV.
789, 791 (1992) (examining "Justice Brennan's transformation from primary advocate to lead-
ing dissenter in obscenity cases decided during the Warren, Burger and Rehnquist Courts").
25 Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 73 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("I am
convinced that the approach initiated 16 years ago in Roth v. United States and culminating in
the Court's decision today, cannot bring stability to this area of the law without jeopardizing
fundamental First Amendment values.") (citation omitted).
26 Roth, 354 U.S. at 487.
27 FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: APHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 182 (1982).
28 See BAKER, supra note 20, at 9 (discussing Frederick Schauer's argument that obscenity
does not receive constitutional protection because it offers nothing beyond a physical effect).
Roth, 354 U.S. at 487.
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must do more than perform a function or incite behavior; it must ex-
press ideas. 3  By noting how tightly circumscribed the domain of un-
protected sex speech was, Brennan constructed the obscenity analysis
as a tool that would exclude, more than include, protected sex
speech from its scope. Sixteen years later, Brennan would admit:
"The essence of our problem in the obscenity area is that we have
been unable to provide 'sensitive tools' to separate obscenity from
other sexually oriented but constitutionally protected speech, so that
efforts to suppress the former do not spill over into the suppression
of the latter."
Yet even in 1957, there was subtle tension in Brennan's opinion.
On the one hand, he pronounced, without much textual delibera-
tion, that obscenity is unprotected speech; on the other, Brennan
highlighted the importance of protecting controversial, unorthodox,
and hateful ideas such as those contained in much sex speech; but he
made no attempt to discuss some of the obvious issues that arise when
these two sides collide. Namely, how will the new test elucidate the
distinction between obscenity and protected sex speech? Or, more
directly, is the new standard sufficiently non-vague to provide ade-
quate notice to people involved in matters of sex speech as to when
their expression crosses the line from protected to unprotected?2
30 Baker makes this point clearly:
In the marketplace of ideas theory, however, speech must bring about change by the (at
least partly) rational process of convincing people of ideas or opinions .... Thus, the
marketplace theory denies protection to pornography because of the conclusion that
pornography exercises influence in a manner more similar to engaging in sexual activity
than to hearing argument and debate.
BAKER, supra note 20, at 10; see also Robert Post, Encryption Source Code and the First Amendment, 15
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 713, 720-21 (2000) (arguing that encryption software distributed as en-
cryption source code does not garner First Amendment protection because it serves a functional
purpose and does not participate "in public dialogue or debate," whereas the same software
distributed in print, and therefore having an expressive and not functional quality, would merit
protection); Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REv. 1 (2000)
(explaining the regulation of commercial speech, which, though constitutionally functional,
does not express constitutional values, by comparing it to public discourse, which embodies
core constitutional values fostering an exchange of ideas).
31 Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 79-80 (1973) (Brennan,J., dissenting).
32 In his dissent in Paris I, Brennan discusses the issue of adequate notice as it applies to the
statute in question in that case. See id. at 86 (Brennan,J., dissenting) ("[A] vague statute fails to
provide adequate notice to persons who are engaged in the type of conduct that the statute
could be thought to proscribe."). A parallel issue arises in the application of a vague standard.
[Vol. 7:5
OBSCENITY STANDARD
The issue of vagueness was not discussed at all 33 partially because
the focus of the case was on the overbreadth of the antiquated and
undoubtedly inadequate existing standard borrowed from the Eng-
lish Common Law case Regina v. Hicklin.34 The task of repairing the
Hicklin test was simple, as lower courts had already begun to imple-
ment an intuitive and seemingly innocuous substitute that called for a
contextual analysis of the questionable material by requiring that it
be taken as a whole. ' Moreover, replacing the Hicklin test promised
to cure the glaring restrictiveness, while promising to clarify the dis-
tinction between obscenity and protected sex speech. 6
In rejecting the Hicklin test, for example, the Court wrote:
The Hicklin test, judging obscenity by the effect of isolated passages upon
the most susceptible persons, might well encompass material legitimately
treating with sex, and so it must be rejected as unconstitutionally restric-
tive of the freedoms of speech and press. On the other hand, the substi-
tuted standard pr7ovides safeguards adequate to withstand the charge of constitu-
tional infirmity.
Because "sex and obscenity are not synonymous, ''9 the Court ob-
jected to sanctioning the implementation of a test that was effectively
unconstitutionally overrestrictive in its sweep, brushing out unpro-
tected as well as protected sex speech. Noting how other courts had
already rejected the Hicklin test for a more flexible standard, 9 the
Court substituted the following test: "whether to the average person,
applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme
of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest.
40
In part, the changes enacted by the new test were aimed at reme-
dying the problem of having the most susceptible person in the
33 In his dissent in Paris I, Brennan concedes that the potential for vagueness inherent in the
Roth test evaded the majority because it had decided the case "in the abstract and without refer-
ence to the particular material before the Court." Id. at 80 (Brennan, J., dissenting). He fur-
ther substantiates this explanation by discussing the multiple interpretations that have adhered
to the test in attempts to render it functional. See id. at 84 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[W]e are
manifestly unable to describe [obscenity] in advance except by reference to concepts so elusive
that they fail to distinguish clearly between protected and unprotected speech.").
3 L.R. 360 (Q.B. 1868) (framing the issue of obscenity as "whether the tendency of the
matter charged as obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such im-
moral influences and into whose hands a publication of this sort may fall").
35 See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957) ("Both trial courts below followed the
proper standard.").
See id. at 489 ("[T]he substituted standard provides safeguards adequate to withstand the
charge of constitutional infirmity.").
37 Id. (emphasis added).
3 Id. at 487.
39 Id. at 489 ("Some American Courts adopted [the Hicklin] standard but later decisions
have rejected it.").
40 Id. (emphasis added).
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community, say a literate child, act as the arbiter of obscenity.41 Also
new to the test was the notion of "contemporary community stan-
dards, 42 which would give different jurisdictions across the country
discretion in determining obscenity in relation to local standards.
More pertinently, though, was the introduction of the phrase, "as a
whole," 4 to the analysis, which served primarily to remedy the restric-
tiveness problem.
Brennan recognized that analysis of isolated excerpts was more
likely to result in the banning of protected sex speech. One way of
mitigating the problem was to expand the scope of the material to be
scrutinized to allow for a fairer assessment of whether the speech was
"utterly without redeeming social importance."45 That is, it was intui-
tive to the Court that material taken out of context was more likely to
appear obscene. A close-up photograph of human genitalia, for ex-
ample, is certainly less likely to be deemed obscene in the context of
a medical textbook than if it were evaluated in isolation.
B. Judge Hand's Objective: To Protect Literature
The jurisprudential genesis of the phrase, "as a whole," can be
traced to a Second Circuit opinion delivered by Judge Augustus N.
Hand in 1934.46 On trial wasJamesJoyce's novel Ulysses. Judge Hand
held, "The book as a whole is not pornographic, and, while in not a
few spots it is coarse, blasphemous, and obscene, it does not, in our
opinion, tend to promote lust.... The questions in each case [is]
whether a publication taken as a whole has a libidinous effect."4  By
requiring that ostensibly obscene material be considered in the
greater context of the whole, Judge Hand guaranteed that literature,
like "works of physiology, medicine, science, and sex instruction,8
41 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 33 (1973) ("[T]he primary concern with requiring a
jury to apply the standard of 'the average person, applying contemporary community standards'
is to be certain that ... it will be judged by its impact on an average person, rather than a par-
ticularly susceptible or sensitive person-or indeed a totally insensitive one.").
42 The Court relied on the instructions to the jury as delivered by the trial judge. "'The test
in each case is the effect of the book, picture or publication considered as a whole, not upon
any particular class, but upon all those whom it is likely to reach. In other words, you deter-
mine its impact upon the average person in the community."' Roth, 354 U.S. at 490.
43 See Miller, 413 U.S. at 30 (explaining proper application of the contemporary community
standards test).
Roth, 354 U.S. at 489.
45 Id. at 484.
46 See United States v. One Book Entitled Ulysses by James Joyce, 72 F.2d 705, 707 (2d Cir.
1934) (holding that the test in determining whether a book is obscene within a statute prohibit-
ing importation of any "obscene" book is whether the book taken as a whole has a libidinous
effect).
47 Id. (emphasis added).
4 Id.
[Vol. 7:5
OBSCENITY STANDARD
which were deemed outside the scope of the New York obscenity
statute in question, 9 would also be guaranteed constitutional protec-
tion. Hand explained: "We think the same immunity should apply to
literature as to science, where the presentation when viewed objec-
tively, is sincere, and the erotic matter is not introduced to promote
lust and does not furnish the dominant note of the publication.
50
Judge Hand, like Brennan, approached the First Amendment
question from a marketplace of ideas position, but his analysis was
more restrictive than Brennan's. Hand, by openly acknowledging his
desire to protect a certain forum of expression, implemented an
analysis of the medium as a proxy for determining whether speech
was obscene and used the contextual analysis to determine whether
the medium, in this case the book, represented a legitimate forum
for some obscene speech. 5' Unlike Brennan's, this implementation
of the contextual analysis provided an appealingly non-vague stan-
dard: in cases where the material in question contained obscene
elements, if it was literature, then it would be deemed protected
speech. This kind of analysis hopes that the "obscene" material in
question will be subsumed by the legitimating integrity of the me-
dium. The focus of the analysis is very simply on the medium.
The discussion in the Ulysses opinion, for example, is devoted to a
debate on the differences between "standard" books and literature. 52
Hand's reasoning for not banning Ulysses emphasized the character-
istics of the medium: "The book before us has such portentous
length, is written with such evident truthfulness in its depiction of
certain types of humanity, and is so little erotic in its result, that it
does not fall within the forbidden class.,
53
But what it evaded in terms of vagueness, Hand's implementation
of the contextual analysis rediscovered in restrictiveness. By imple-
menting it as a tool to assess the degree of literary merit, the "as a
whole" analysis excluded from consideration less esteemed writings
that contemplated obscenity. It was a much more restrictive test be-
cause it preemptively foreclosed the use of media that traditionally
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Hand's approach, protecting media instead of protecting speech, is consistent with con-
temporary First Amendment doctrine. See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Paternalism, Politics, and Citizen
Freedom: The Commercial Speech Quandary in Nike, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1161, 1169 (2004) (ar-
guing that in the context of commercial speech, the identity of the speaker or the medium of
communication is important to determining whether there is protection).
52 72 F.2d at 707 ("The main difference between many standard works and Ulysses is its far
more abundant use of coarse and colloquial words and presentation of dirty scenes, rather than
in any excess of prurient suggestion.").
53 Id. (emphasis added).
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had not been used to communicate ideas as vehicles for sex speech .
Hand thought that by considering the context in which questionable
matter was presented, a court could determine if that context fit into
one of the concretely defined categories-art or science, for exam-
ple-that could serve as a legitimate vehicle for obscenity. In other
words, only literary or scientific value could redeem obscenity.
Hand's test is essentially what is embodied in today's Miller test.
55
Brennan's understanding of the test, on the other hand, eschewed
neither vagueness nor restrictiveness. Brennan's nuanced under-
standing of the test embedded onto it a guise of clarity by overlook-
ing that the "as a whole" analysis ultimately would require the trier of
fact to assess the legitimacy of a given context.6 That is, the "as a
whole" analysis requires an analysis of the material as a whole, but
also of the greater context that encompasses the whole in order to
determine whether the whole is merely a pretextual arrangement
meant to garner protection. The test requires an analysis of the text
that exceeds the text's own boundaries. As future cases would dem-
onstrate, this question would come up inevitably and frequently.57
The comparison between Brennan and Hand's understandings of the
contextual analysis presciently suggests that, unless implemented with
the mechanical and restrictive precision used by Hand, context can-
not serve as a sufficiently sensitive tool for distinguishing protected
sex speech from obscenity.
II. THE "REMEDIAL" EVOLUTION OF THE CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS
In the Supreme Court's subsequent modifications of the obscenity
doctrine, Brennan expanded the scope of contextual analysis with the
54 Such a rationale is not inconsistent with the Court's doctrine on extending First Amend-
ment protection to new media. See, e.g., Mut. Film Corp. v. Indus. Comm'n, 236 U.S. 230, 244
(1915) (holding motion pictures are not a vehicle of communication to be protected by the
First Amendment), overruled byJoseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501-02 (1952) ("It
cannot be doubted that motion pictures are a significant medium for the communication of
ideas. They may affect public attitudes and behavior in a variety of ways, ranging from direct
espousal of a political or social doctrine to the subtle shaping of thought which characterizes all
artistic expression.").
55 See infra Part II.C (discussing the redefinition of obscenity under the Miller test).
56 In other words, in terms analogous to Hand's opinion, the trier of fact would have to de-
cide if the context is of sufficient caliber, i.e., literature, to garner protected status.
57 See, e.g., Splawn v. California, 431 U.S. 595, 598-99 (1977) (upholding jury instructions
permitting the jury to consider the circumstances of distribution to determine whether peti-
tioner's claims of social importance were pretense or reality); Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229,
231-32 (1972) (finding that the publication in question was not a "mere vehicle" for insulating
potentially obscene material); Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 470 (1966) (discussing
the relevance of circumstances of presentation in determining whether claims of social impor-
tance are "pretense or reality").
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hope of correcting the vagueness and lingering restrictiveness de-
fects.
A. Pandering"8 as Evidence of Obscenity
1. Memoirs and the Pandering Gloss
Before the Court in A Book Named 'John Cleland's Memoirs of a
Woman of Pleasure" v. Massachusetts 9 was the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court's judgment declaring John Cleland's 1749 novel, Mem-
oirs of a Woman of Pleasure, obscene. The novel recounts, by means of
unapologetically graphic narration, the experiences of a young
woman in a brothel.60 The Court in Memoirs transformed the Roth test
into a three-prong test retaining the Roth Court's understanding of
obscenity as being "utterly without redeeming social value."61
The Memoirs test asked the trier of fact to determine whether, "(a)
the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to a
prurient interest in sex; (b) the material is patently offensive because
it affronts contemporary community standards relating to the de-
scription or representation of sexual matters; and (c) the material is
utterly without redeeming social value."62 The Court made clear that
63the test was conjunctive.
In reversing the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's decision
that Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure was obscene, the Court considered
evidence of its literary merit,6 and also held that "evidence 'as to the
manner and form of its publication, advertisement, and distribu-
tion '' 65 would also be relevant.6   That is, though a book was "ob-
58 Pandering is defined in Ginzburg as "'the business of purveying textual or graphic matter
openly advertised to appeal to the erotic interest of their customers.'" Ginzburg, 383 U.S. at 467
(quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 495-96 (1957) (Warren, C.J., concurring)).
59 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
60 See id. at 416 n.1 (discussing evidence that summarizes the plot of the novel).
61 Id. at 419 ("A book cannot be proscribed unless it is found to be utterly without redeem-
ing social value. This is so even though the book is found to possess the requisite prurient ap-
peal and to be patently offensive.").
62 Id. at 418.
63 The Court stated:
Each of the three federal constitutional criteria is to be applied independently; the social
value of the book can neither be weighed against nor canceled by its prurient appeal or
patent offensiveness. Hence, even on the view of the court below that Memoirs possessed
only a modicum of social value, its judgment must be reversed as being founded on an
erroneous interpretation of a federal constitutional standard.
Id. at 419-20.
64 See id. at 415-16 ("[T]he court received the book in evidence and also, as allowed by the
section, heard the testimony of experts and accepted other evidence, such as book reviews, in
order to assess the literary, cultural, or educational character of the book.").
65 Id. at 417.
66 Discussing relevant evidence, the Court stated:
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scene," it may be redeemed by virtue of its status as literature, unless
it was marketed as pornography, in which case it would not be pro-
tected speech despite its not being utterly without redeeming social
importance.
By allowing evidence of the manner of distribution, the Court ex-
panded the meaning of the "as a whole" analysis to encompass not
only the boundaries of the text, but also the conduct on the part of
the purveyor. The Court was willing to consider evidence of how and
why material was sold in order to make a determination as to the kind
of material under scrutiny. At this point in its history, the "as a
whole" analysis began to resemble the analysis Judge Hand proffered
in 1934. Through the addition of the pandering gloss, 7 the "as a
whole" analysis became both vague and restrictive, because the gloss
impossibly aimed at assessing literary value as well as authorial or
publisher intent, but also required the material in question to possess
certain indicators of value.
2. The Consequences of the Pandering Gloss: More Vagueness and
Restrictiveness plus Regulation of Protected Sex Speech
While it touched upon pandering in Memoirs, the Court delved
into it in greater detail in its companion case, Ginzburg v. United
States.68 At issue in Ginzburg were three adult publications 9 deemed
obscene by the Third Circuit. Whether each publication in its totality
was obscene was not entirely answered or important. The Court as-
sumed that none were obscene while still affirming the Third Cir-
cuit's conviction. Instead, the Court relied on evidence of pander-
It does not necessarily follow from this reversal that a determination that Memoirs is ob-
scene in the constitutional sense would be improper under all circumstances. On the
premise, which we have no occasion to assess, that Memoirs has the requisite prurient ap-
peal and is patently offensive, but has only a minimum of social value, the circumstances
of production, sale, and publicity are relevant in determining whether or not the publi-
cation or distribution of the book is constitutionally protected. Evidence that the book
was commercially exploited for the sake of prurient appeal, to the exclusion of all other
values, might justify the conclusion that the book was utterly without redeeming social
importance.
Id. at 420.
67 See supra notes 58-66 and accompanying text.
68 383 U.S. 463 (1966) (holding that although accused publications might not be obscene
themselves, convictions could be sustained based on evidence of defendant's pandering pro-
duction, sale, and publicity with respect to publications).
(1 Id. at 466 ("The three publications were EROS, a hard-cover magazine of expensive for-
mat; Liaison, a bi-weekly newsletter; and The Housewife's Handbook on Selective Promiscuity... a
short book.").
70 The Court stated:
[T]he prosecution charged the offense in the context of the circumstances of produc-
tion, sale, and publicity and assumed that, standing alone, the publications themselves
might not be obscene. We agree that the question of obscenity may include considera-
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ing to resolve "the ultimate question of obscenity' 1 and held,
"[w]here the purveyor's sole emphasis is on the sexually provocative
aspects of his publications, that fact may be decisive in the determina-
tion of obscenity."
7 2
a. Vagueness
The Court declared that a court's perception of a reader's recep-
tion of the questionable material lent credence to a disposition of ob-
scenity: "The deliberate representation of petitioners' publications as
erotically arousing, for example, stimulated the reader to accept
them as Prurient; he looks for titillation, not for saving intellectual
content." As for vagueness, at least two levels of highly subjective
analysis must be scaled for the trier of fact to make the "decisive" de-
termination and for the purveyor to understand what the standard
requires. First, both the purveyor and the court must assess the os-
tensibly obscene material by engaging the first two prongs of the
standard. Second, by speculating on the potential effect of the mate-
rial on the public, both may consider the circumstances of distribu-
tion as well as evidence of textual merit to assess the creative and dis-
tributive intent.
b. Restrictiveness
Evidence of pandering may not only propel non-obscene sexual
material into the realm of obscenity, but it may also transform ob-
scene material with redeeming value into unprotected speech. Thus,
evidence of pandering may be dispositive of whether speech is consti-
tutionally protected. By allowing evidence of pandering to be deter-
minative of the question whether the sexually oriented speech is un-
protected, the Court bypassed the fundamental concern over
preserving protected speech and rendered the obscenity standard
overrestrictive.
The logic behind the Court's decision is to guard against pretex-
tual claims aimed to insulate obscene material from judicial scru-
tiny:.4
tion of the setting in which the publications were presented as an aid to determining the
question of obscenity, and assume without deciding that the prosecution could not have
succeeded otherwise.
Id. at 465-66.
71 Id. at 470 (stating that the evidence of pandering "serves to resolve all ambiguity and
doubt").
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 See id. (stating that certain evidence may clarify whether claims are spurious).
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[T]he circumstances of presentation and dissemination of material are
equally relevant to determining whether social importance claimed for
material in the courtroom was, in the circumstances, pretense or real-
ity-whether it was the basis upon which it was traded in the marketplace
or a spurious claim for litigation purposes.... Certainly in a prosecution
which, as here, does not necessarily imply suppression of the materials
involved, the fact that they originate or are used as a subject of pandering
75is relevant to the application of the Roth test.
The pandering gloss is helpful, according to the Court's reasoning, in
cases where the material in question is unabashedly sexual in nature
and this feature is highlighted in its marketing. 6 While pandering
could never itself be a pretense, 77 it may serve to shed light on the
non-pretextual intentions of the purveyor. That is, a medical text on
sexuality, or, returning to the previous case, a novel such as Memoirs of
a Woman of Pleasure, each presumed protected speech, if sold as por-
nography would instruct a court of the purveyor's pretextual claim of
social importance and render the text unprotected speech.
c. Regulation of Protected Sex Speech
Moreover, the pandering gloss requires that the manner of distri-
bution temper the sexual intensity of the publication, and thus has
the tacit effect of regulating sex speech. When litigated, all sex
speech must conform to this analysis. The Court says that one cannot
promote sexually provocative material as such or it might be deemed
unprotected if it contains any obscene element. Moreover, by means
of this gloss, the Court makes panderers sued under obscenity
charges liable for obscenity even though they are engaging in an ex-
ercise of their First Amendment rights to disseminate otherwise pro-
tected speech. 8
Another illustration: in reversing the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts, the Court considered the following evidence pre-
sented by Boston area scholars: "the book is a minor 'work of art'
75 Id. at 470-71. As Ginzburg is a companion case to Memoirs, the Court refers to the Roth
test, and not the Memoirs test, from where the revised Roth test will emerge.
76 See id. at 470 ("Where the purveyor's sole emphasis is on the sexually provocative aspects
of his publications, that fact may be decisive in the determination of obscenity.").
77 In Ginzburg, the defendant "deliberately emphasized the sexually provocative aspects of
the work." Id. at 472. Certainly, no defendant would pretextually claim to be pandering, as this
would only weaken his or her claim.
78 See, e.g., State v. Ceci, 255 A.2d 700, 704 (Del. Super. Ct. 1969) (denying defendant's mo-
tion to dismiss, finding that the placement of obscene language to attract attention to a consti-
tutionally protected message does not make the obscenity protected speech); Dillingham v.
State, 267 A.2d 777, 786 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1970) (reversing lower court opinion that a car-
toon was obscene, by applying the Memoirs test); People v. Quentin, 296 N.Y.S.2d 443, 446 (N.Y.
Dist. Ct. 1968) (holding pamphlet was obscene because it was obviously used to attract attention
and appeal to prurient interests).
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having 'literary merit' and 'historical value' and containing a good
deal of 'deliberate, calculated comedy.' It is a piece of 'social history
of interest to anyone who is interested in fiction as a way of understanding
society in the past."'79
It is ironic that the Court found "obscene" material written over
two-hundred years ago worthy of Constitutional protection because it
provided insight into a "society in the past," but it may deem contem-
porary material of the same ilk unprotected speech. The Court fur-
ther states:
A saving grace is that although many scenes, if translated into the present
day language of "the realistic, naturalistic novel, could be quite offensive"
these scenes are not described in such language. The book contains no
dirty words and its language "functions... to create a distance, even
when the sexual experiences are portrayed. "s°
In essence, the Court is willing to protect old, arguably obscene nov-
els because they provide insight into the past and do not use "offen-
sive" language, by contemporary standards, but it is less willing to
protect a contemporary novel that uses "present day" language and
promises to provide similar historical insight to future generations.
The Court is foreclosing the genre of the realistic novel to writers of
sexual matters. In other words, because Memoirs of a Woman of Pleas-
ure is not written in contemporary jargon, and consequently the
erotic passages are cloaked in outdated English, it is less constitution-
ally suspect.
The Court is more inclined to protect speech that allows someone
to read fiction as a way of understanding the past than as a way of un-
derstanding the present. Furthermore, if the book, written in lan-
guage reflecting the characters' background or personality were to be
marketed as a candid memoir, the courts would have a further op-
portunity to deny it constitutional protection. Memoirs of a Woman of
Pleasure, however, in its time, was written precisely in the language of
the day and likely not marketed as literature, and that is why, the
Court concedes, it is valued today. The obscenity standard, as im-
plemented by the Court, chills the speech of a contemporary John
Cleland."
A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Massachusetts, 383
U.S. 413, 416 n.2 (1966) (emphasis added).
go Id. (quoting evidence submitted to the trial court).
81 See Amy Adler, Note, Post-Modern Art and the Death of Obscenity Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1359, 1366
(1990) ("[I]n Post-Modem art, the next Ulysses is likely to be a work that is precisely about its own
'second-rateness.'"). Professor Adler makes a similar argument regarding the chilling effect of
the Miller test with regard to contemporary post-modern artists. Adler argues that the work of
such artists, which relies, in part, on the tools, media, and language of their generation, repre-
sents a portrait of the thought, culture, and times that surround them. Sexually explicit mate-
rial is integral to much of this work. Consequently, "[a]ny Post-Modem artist who uses sexually
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B. Kois and the Rational Relation Requirement
Kois v. Wisconsin8 2 is significant because it introduced the gloss of
"rational relation" to the "as a whole" analysis, justifying its incorpora-
tion into the test as a tool for detecting pretextual editorializing.
In Kois, the defendant underground newspaper, Kaleidoscope,
was convicted of disseminating obscene material, small photographs
of a nude couple embracing, in violation of a Wisconsin statute. The
accompanying article reported that the photographs were "similar" to
one that lead to the arrest of a Kaleidoscope photographer for pos-
session of obscene material.84 The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the
State Supreme Court's conviction of the newspaper on grounds that
there was no reason to believe "that the article was a mere vehicle for
the publication of the pictures ... because in the context in which
they appeared in the newspaper they were rationally related to an arti-
cle that itself was clearly entitled to the protection of the Fourteenth
Amendment.,
5
1. Protecting Against Pretextual Claims
The case, interestingly, exemplified the quintessential application
of the contextual analysis as Brennan envisioned it in Roth. "Ob-
scene" and consequently unprotected pictures threatened to strip
constitutional protection from an otherwise protected newspaper
publication. Instead of looking at isolated excerpts (i.e., the two pic-
tures in the newspaper), the trier of fact was required to consider the
greater context, and the result was the salvation of the newspaper and
the preservation of sex speech. The facts of the case and the Court's
analysis follow closely the contours of the marketplace of ideas the-
ory: while the pictures may be obscene and have a prurient appeal,
they formed part of an exchange of ideas-notably so by virtue of
their placement in a quintessential First Amendment medium, the
newspaper.
explicit material could be at risk under Miller, and the potential chilling effect is incalculable."
Id. at 1373.
82 408 U.S. 229, 230-31 (1972) (per curiam) (holding that two relatively small newspaper
pictures, which showed a nude man and a nude woman embracing, were rationally related to an
article in a newspaper, and, as such, were not unconstitutionally prohibited speech).
83 This is the genesis of the rational relation gloss to the "as a whole" part of the Miller test,
which will spawn similar glosses such as, "thematically integrated" and "interrelated," all requir-
ing some kind of narrative or thematic cohesion of the material in question. See Penthouse In-
tern. Ltd. v. McAuliffe, 610 F.2d 1353, 1370 (5th Cir. 1980) (requiring that the content of the
work be "thematically integrated" or "interrelated").
Kois, 408 U.S. at 229-30 (summarizing the facts surrounding the allegedly obscene mate-
rial).
Id. at 231 (emphasis added).
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The Court's ruling in Kois curiously granted protected status to an
"obscene" photograph by virtue of its placement in a protected publi-
cation. The Court acknowledged, however, that the factual holding
of this case needed qualification to avoid exactly such a reading-one
giving a green light to publishers to print obscene material alongside
non-obscene text in order to insulate the former. In other words, the
Court plugged a hole in the contextual analysis that would allow au-
thors or publishers to create contexts that were mere vehicles of, or
pretexts for ostensibly obscene material.
To this effect, the Court wrote:
We do not think it can fairly be said... that the article was a mere vehicle
for the publication of the pictures .... We find it unnecessary to consider
whether the State could constitutionally prohibit the dissemination of the
pictures by themselves, because in the context in which they appeared in
the newspaper they were rationally related to an article that itself was
clearly entitled to the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment.
86
The Court expressed concern over the possibility that publishers or
purveyors of sex speech might attempt to insulate potentially obscene
material by including in their publications constitutionally redeeming
text. As showcased in the Memoirs and Ginzburg opinions, this is an
inevitable defect of the "as a whole" analysis."7 The Court attempted
to patch it up, though, by requiring questionable material to be "ra-
tionally related" to the rest of the content. The question raised by
the emergence of this gloss is: how do we know that requiring a ra-
tional relationship between items in a text is a constitutionally effec-
tive way of weeding out shams without also weeding out protected
speech? What if a text does not lend itself to internal cohesion, such
as a collage, a magazine, or the Internet?ss
86 Id. at 230-31 (emphasis added).
87 See supra notes 58-77.
8 In a slightly different way, Professor Amy Adler raises similar issues when discussing post-
modern art. The movement, she argues, resists conventional art forms and depends on per-
formance, mixed media, and other representations, for example. As such, the current obscen-
ity standard does not represent a tool sufficiently adequate to analyze post-modern art because
it is drafted with an understanding of art that predates this form of art. She writes, "Thus Miller
has etched in stone a theory of art that was itself a product of only a transitory phase in art his-
tory-the period of late Modernism." Adler, supra note 81, at 1364; see also Margaret Jane
Radin, Online Standardization and the Integration of Text and Machine, 70 FORDHAM L. REv. 1125
(2002) (discussing how online technologies and texts, in Internet space, occupy a role that is
simultaneously functional and expressive, and speculating that the further conflation of these
normally separate fields may lead to difficulty in distinguishing what is text and what is function
for legal purposes).
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2. Vagueness and Restrictiveness
To punctuate its reasoning, the Kois Court provided a conspicu-
ously ambiguous metaphor requiring intratextual, as well as intertex-
tual cohesion: "A quotation from Voltaire in the flyleaf of a book will
not constitutionally redeem an otherwise obscene publication. '"8 9 Be-
cause it incorporates a medium other than the one in question in the
case and also inverts the factual pattern of the case, the analogy gen-
erated a series of interpretations that result in further vagueness and
restrictiveness.
As applied to the facts of the case, the metaphor suggests a plain
qualitative interpretation requiring a rational relation between the
part and the whole: rationally unrelated obscene pictures will render
unprotected otherwise constitutionally protected material. Such an
analysis can be understood to require intratextual cohesion, that is, in-
terrelation among elements of the text. Moreover, the quantitative
incongruity of one singular quotation in the context of an obscene
book-one erudite quotation will not redeem an obscene book-also
suggests that triers of fact should engage a quantitative analysis. Mul-
tiple opinions citing to Kois have read the metaphor to require any of
these interpretations. 9
The variety of interpretations presents a problem of vagueness for
the trier of fact who must determine which one of these, if not all, the
Court intended. While it does not by itself present a constitutional
defect, this level of vagueness does also complicate matters for indi-
viduals or entities looking for practical guidance with regard to defin-
ing obscenity. Furthermore, the application of a quantitative analysis
that would commit the trier of fact to counting pages, pictures, or ar-
ticles91 to make a constitutional assessment raises an eyebrow. Such a
proposition is certainly inconsistent with Brennan's rationale for the
contextual analysis. Granting protected status on the basis of internal
narrative or thematic cohesion seems arbitrary and irrelevant to the
goal of distinguishing protected speech from obscenity.
89 Kois, 408 U.S. at 231.
90 See, e.g., Penthouse Int'l, Ltd. v. McAuliffe, 610 F.2d 1353, 1375, n.4 (5th Cir. 1980)
(Kravitch, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (analyzing the material in question by
comparing the number of images to the number of articles); City of St. George v. Turner, 813
P.2d 1188, 1193 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (citing Kois and quoting the Voltaire analogy as part of its
contextual analysis; finding rational relation between two drawings and the collage in which
they appear); State v.J-R Distrib., 512 P.2d 1049, 1074 (Wash. 1973) (citing Millerfor its applica-
tion of the Kois test and finding no rational relation between pictures and the article along
which they appear).
91 See Penthouse, 610 F.2d at 1375 (Kravitch, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
("[T]he 'as a whole' test cannot begin and end with a page count. The quantity of the objec-
tionable material is, however, one aspect which must be considered when determining whether
the first prong has been satisfied.").
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Moreover, by using a book in its analogy, the Court suggested that
all media, not just newspapers or magazines, which are often less nar-
ratively or thematically coherent, may be subject to this analysis. It is
generally not debated that when a book comes under scrutiny as po-
tentially obscene, the whole book and not individual chapters
2
should be contemplated when applying the "as a whole" analysis. As
the Court's "rational relation" gloss suggests, by its nature the con-
tents of a book are generally rationally related.93 Furthermore, the
reference to a book's "flyleaf' imports the pandering gloss by suggest-
ing that the marketing of the text is relevant and also opens the
analysis to require intertextual cohesion between the text (the book)
and associated media (the flyleaf)-that is, asking the trier of fact to
find cohesion in scenarios involving multiple media as well as mixed
media.94
The logic behind the rational relation gloss stems from an implicit
and inaccurate reliance on a conventional understanding of certain
media that are quintessentially linear and cohesive, such as book and
film. 95 The Court believes that by identifying those qualities that
characterize certain fora of speech-literature or books or novels, for
example-it can assure the legitimacy of the media and, by force of
labored reasoning, the protected status of its content.9 6 Certain me-
dia, like magazines and the Internet, however, possess qualities unlike
those of books or film. And, the application of tests developed with
92 See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 502 (1957) (Harlan,J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part) ("I agree with the Court, of course, that the books must be judged as a
whole.").
93 See People v. Mature Enter., Inc., 343 N.Y.S.2d 911 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1973) (stating that the
"written word" is more resilient to obscenity analysis than film).
94 Courts, when considering mixed media under the obscenity doctrine, have analyzed each
medium separately. See United States v. Merrill, 746 F.2d 458, 464 (9th Cir. 1984) (finding de-
fendant's letter pasted with pornographic playing cards to be a "sham political statement").
95 It is common for contemporary theorists to draw qualitative distinctions among media or
texts based on their linear attributes. See LUCIANO FLORIDI, PHILOSOPHY AND COMPUTING 126
(Routledge 1999) (noting at least four ways a document can be non-linear); id. at 94-97, 99
(discussing the destruction of the book, the fragmentation of knowledge, and the evolution of
non-linear representations of knowledge); James Blustein and Mark S. Stavely, Methods of Gener-
ating and Evaluating Hypertext, 35 ANN. REV. OF INFO. & So. TECH. 299-335 (Martha E. Williams
ed., 2001) (analyzing four different ways in which a text may be non-linear); see alsoJanet H.
Murray, Inventing the Medium, in THE NEW MEDIA READER 3 (Noah Wardrip-Fruin & Nick Mont-
fort eds., 2003) ("[The two authors] are both almost viscerally aware of the increased complex-
ity of human consciousness and the failure of linear media to capture the structures of our
thought."), available at http://www.mrl.nyu.edu/-noah/nmr/book-samples/nmr-intro-murray-
excerpt.pdf.
96 This was the rationale guidingJudge Hand in his decision to require a contextual analysis
in order to protect literature. See supra Part I.B.
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older media in mind, such as the rational relation gloss, to newer
media further exacerbates the potential for restrictiveness.
9 7
While it is not inconsistent with constitutional doctrine for courts
to use interpretive aids creatively, such an insensitive application of
analyses is inconsistent with Brennan's desire in Roth to implement a
test that would assist in detecting protected sex speech. Under the
rational relation gloss, the subject of the analysis is not the quality or
nature of the speech, but the integrity of the vehicle of communica-
tion.
C. The Miller Test: Obscenity Redefined as Speech
Lacking in "Serious Value"
Significant in the Miller revision of the Roth-Memoirs test was the
change in language, particularly, in the third prong. Both the first
and third prongs take on "the work" in lieu of "the dominant theme"
(prong one) and "the material" (prong three).99 More significantly,
the third prong abandons the requirement that the material be "ut-
terly without social value" because the Court felt it created "a burden
virtually impossible to discharge under our criminal standards of
proof.' ° In its stead, the Court asked the trier of fact to determine
"whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, po-
litical, or scientific value."10'
The effect of the modification was to replace the guiding defini-
tion of obscenity articulated in Roth with a standard requiring "seri-
ous value" of the work in question. Justice Brennan made this clear
in his dissent in Paris I: "[T] he Court today permits suppression if
the government can prove that the materials lack 'serious literary, ar-
tistic, political or scientific value.' But the definition of 'obscenity' as
expression utterly lacking in social importance is the key to the concep-
tual basis of Roth and our subsequent opinions.' ' 2
Moreover, the use of the word "serious" compels the trier of fact
to evaluate the material in question much like Judge Hand suggested
when he sought to use the contextual analysis to determine the value
97 See Adler, supra note 81, at 1364 ("Thus Miller has etched in stone a theory of art that was
itself a product of only a transitory phase in art history-the period of late Modernism.").
98 See, e.g., Penthouse Int'l, Ltd. v. McAuliffe, 610 F.2d 1353 (5th Cir. 1980) (interpreting the
rational relation gloss in Kois to provide for a quantitative analysis of the material).
99 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 21 (1973) (discussing the three prongs of the obscenity
standard as presented in Roth and modified by Memoirs).
00 Id. at 22 ("Thus, even as they repeated the words of Roth, the Memoirs plurality produced a
drastically altered test that called on the prosecution to prove a negative, i.e., that the material
was 'utterly without redeeming social value'-a burden virtually impossible to discharge under
our criminal standards of proof.") (emphasis removed).
01 Id. at 24.
102 413 U.S. 49, 97 (1973) (Brennan,J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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or classification of the media in question. The requirement that a
work is serious connotes or implicates qualitative integrity and ques-
tions of intent, and, as such, refers back to and imports the pander-
ing gloss of Memoirs-Ginzburg and the "rational relation" gloss of
Kois. 0 While drafting the third prong with language that signifies or
refers back to multiple glosses seems to be an efficient manner of
condensing the test, in fact, the effect was to embed the analytical
tools plagued with defects of vagueness and restrictiveness into a ge-
neric standard that would be applied indiscriminately to all media
and fact patterns. The Miller revision effectively requires certain tex-
tual characteristics of all media under scrutiny without acknowledg-
ing the unique characteristics of each medium that enable it to gen-
erate serious value on its own terms.
0 4
A serious consideration resulting from this is a chilling effect on
choice of media decisions, where individuals are less likely to use a
medium, such as the Internet, because of its inherent inability to con-
form to protected sex speech standards. 0 5 Justice Kennedy makes
this clear when he wrote in Ashcroft v. ACLU. "'Our prior decisions
have voiced particular concern with laws that foreclose an entire me-
dium of expression.... [T]he danger they pose to the freedom of
speech is readily apparent-by eliminating a common means of
speaking, such measures can suppress too much speech.
' '
10
6
CONCLUSION
Discussions on unconstitutional vagueness and overbreadth over-
lap, 107 particularly in the context of obscenity, where the initial rem-
103 A commentator argues that the application of the second rational relation analysis in Kois
to a poem in the publication, turned on the Court's finding that the poem "bears some of the
earmarks of an attempt at serious art," and links this to the Court's decision in Miller to require
serious value in the work in question. EdwardJohn Main, The Neglected Prong of the Miller Test for
Obscenity: Serious Literary, Artistic, Political, or Scientific Value, 11 S. ILL. U. L.J. 1159, 1164 (citing
Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229, 231 (1972)).
104 Furthermore, the "serious value" prong makes it more difficult to grant protected status to
material that is deemed obscene by virtue of the first two prongs. The Court seemingly tem-
pered this by having the trier of fact apply not "contemporary community standards," which
apply to the first two prongs, but a "national standard" to determine such value. Also, there is
currently much debate over whether the change to national standards in the third prong is a
phantom gesture to give the appearance that the standard creates a national floor of tolerance
for obscenity. Id. at 1171 (discussing the difficulties of applying a national standard).
105 Justice Clarence D. Thomas in Ashcroft v. ACLUconfirms this point when he suggested, "if
a [web] publisher wishes for its material to be judged only by the standards of particular com-
munities, then it need only take the simple step of utilizing a medium that enables it to target
the release of its material into those communities." 535 U.S. 564, 583 (2002).
106 Id. at 596 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 55
(1994)).
107 See, e.g., Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 609 (1967) ("Where statutes have an
overbroad sweep, just as where they are vague, 'the hazard of loss or substantial impairment of
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edy to unconstitutional restrictiveness was the implementation of a
vague standard. The comparison between Justice Brennan's and
Judge Hand's understandings of obscenity doctrine demonstrates
that an inherent flaw in the obscenity standard is the shortcoming of
the contextual analysis embedded in the "as a whole" part of the test.
Though analyzing questionable material in context is preferable
to doing so in isolation, a contextual analysis opens the door widely
to pretextual arrangements of the material. Consequently, the con-
textual analysis defends against this by becoming more restrictive and
vague. In this manner, the "as a whole" analysis generates overrestric-
tive results by chipping away at protected sex speech that has the mis-
fortune of being situated in inadequate media.
Moreover, because the standard so frequently conflates protected
sex speech and obscenity, vagueness cloaks the entire analysis. l8 The
inherent vagueness of the standard has the concurrent and unfortu-
nate effect of obfuscating the restrictiveness problem. The standard
has so effectively blurred any concrete distinction between the two
that no one can say when protected sex speech is being swept away as
obscenity.
The obscenity standard functions in practice as a regulation of all
sex speech and disrespects the acknowledgement made by Brennan
that sex speech has value worth protecting. Moreover, it threatens to
impose crippling requirements on those using new media. Because
of these limitations, the Miller test should be retired and a shift to-
ward a liberty theory of freedom of speech should emerge.
10 9
those precious rights may be critical.'" (quoting Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486
(1965)); see Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 359 n.8 (1983) ("[W]e have traditionally viewed
vagueness and overbreadth as logically related and similar doctrines.").
108 Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 84 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[W]e
are manifestly unable to describe [obscenity] in advance except by reference to concepts so elu-
sive that they fail to distinguish clearly between protected and unprotected speech.").
109 The liberty theory would justify the protection of sex speech simply because, as Baker ex-
plains, it "may play an important role in some people's self-fulfillment and self-expression," re-
gardless of the speech's role within a marketplace of ideas. BAKER, supra note 20, at 69 (1989);
see also C. Edwin Baker, Of Course, More than Words, 61 U. CHI. L. REv. 1181, 1197-98 (1994) (cri-
tiquing the argument that because pornography silences certain groups it should be deemed
unprotected speech, by offering a liberty theory interpretation that would, instead of silencing
speech, protect (more) speech that manifests itself "through expressive behavior [rather] than
through traditional arguments about ideas").
[Vol. 7:5
